The Information Revolution and a 'Digital Divide'
There has been much talk of an economic and social revolution taking place over the last few decades. This revolution has been assigned a variety of terms: a 'computer revolution,' a 'knowledge economy,' an 'information revolution,' or a 'third-wave' in human history bringing about a post-industrial, post-service, and postmodern 'network society' (Berkeley, 1962 , Machlup, 1962 , Drucker, 1969 , Jones, 1982 , Dahrendorf, 1977 , Toffler, 1980 , Castells, 1996 , Benkler, 2006 . These revolutions have been widely touted as having far-reaching and largely positive outcomes for society in general. It has been argued that the information revolution can take away power from centralised structures, spread democracy (see Ayres, 1999 , Barber, 1998 , and of course spell the end of poverty (Purcell and Toland, 2004) . Network connections are therefore posited as crucial to obtaining the raw materials of the post-industrial, third-wave, networked society (Castells, 2002) .
There have always been concerns that divergent levels of access to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and uneven global flows of information will exacerbate economic and sociospatial segregation. However, it is only relatively recently that the 'digital divide' has entered into popular discourse. The term has had far-reaching effects: hundreds of projects around the world are framed with the intention of solving or bridging a 'digital divide,' and billions of dollars have been spent to achieve such goals. This article therefore begins by charting the history of the 'digital divide' from concerns about connecting the global peripheries to the imperial centres in the era of the telegraph, to the coining of the term at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
In order to understand why the trope of a 'digital divide' has been able to command such large investments into technology projects (i.e. resources that could conceivably be invested in a variety of other economic and social development programs), the temporal and spatial assumptions embedded into popular uses of the term are examined in detail. This article continues by arguing that solutions to (or bridges across) the 'digital divide' are commonly employed to posit movement along temporal and spatial axes of development. Like many other terms adopted into development discourse over the past few centuries, the 'digital divide' is frequently used to describe an obstacle to movement of people and places temporally along a pre-defined path of development.
The term is also frequently used to make a uniquely spatial argument. Within academic, policy, and popular literatures there is often a common assumption that the anticipate the ways that the Internet would reorganise socio-economic relationships across the globe, the term was initially used to simply describe access (or a lack thereof) to computers. For example, in a report by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in 1998 (one of the first references to the term), the 'digital divide' is specifically used to refer to "computer ownership and usage" (NTIA, 1998) .
In more recent usages, focus has shifted from access to computing hardware to access to communication technologies, or more specifically: the Internet. Often it is even used to refer to differences between reliable and fast connections to the Internet and slow and intermittent ones (Compaine, 2001) . With the advent of ubiquitous computing and the peer-production of information (Graham, 2010c , Graham, 2010a , it is likely that the 'digital divide' will increasingly also be used to refer to integration with the many ubiquitous networked technologies embedded into daily life (Greenfield, 2006 ). Yet, as the Internet remains the focus of most contemporary references to the 'digital divide,' the remainder of this paper will continue to equate the 'digital divide' with access to the Internet. Nonetheless, it should be noted that instead of having a fixed meaning, the term can be seen to be a moving signifier, keeping track with concurrent technological changes.
There has been a recent explosion in usage of the term where, for example, both the World Bank and OECD define the 'digital divide' as a gap between people and places with regard to their access to "information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities" (OECD, 2008) . Almost every major international development agency now has a program to tackle the 'digital divide' and every industrialised nation (as well as many in the global South) devotes significant resources to reversing domestic 'digital divides. ' One of the earliest was the E-rate i Another scheme, and one of the most cited examples of a project that aims to reduce the 'digital divide' is the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) program. Hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles promote the project as a solution to the digital divide, and the project's website even contains one hundred and forty references to the term. The goal of the program is to distribute inexpensive laptops to children across the world. With 1.5 million laptop orders to date, the project has attracted at least $100 million in funding. There are, however, plans to massively expand the project and secure 2.6 billion dollars from the public and private sectors to distribute 100 million OLPC laptops (Deva, 2008) .
program in the United States, where legislation was passed allowing a fee to be levied on all interstate and international telecommunications services. Proceeds were then disbursed to schools and libraries to provide telecommunications service (usually Internet access). Over one billion dollars has been allocated to the program and during negotiations on how to fund the program, many saw even that figure as insufficient to tackling the digital divide (Macavinta 1998 ).
The 'digital divide' has been recognised as an issue at a range of scales including urban and regional governments. For instance, many of the (at least) thirty six cities ii across the world that have invested heavily to establish free wifi networks accessible to all residents also frame their work within the trope of a digital divide (Gibbons and Ruth, 2006 , Goth, 2005 , Tapia et al., 2006 , Kvasny and Keil, 2005 . Even California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has announced that $460 million will be made available to combat the 'digital divide' -defined as "the lack of broadband data transmission to rural and poor urban areas" (Geissinger, 2006) .
The private sector has also contributed enormous funds to 'digital divide' related development programs. For example, Google and HSBC are investing $65 million to launch medium orbit satellites that will provide Internet access to the three billion people without Internet access (Kirk, 2008) ; and in 2006, Intel announced that they would spend one billion dollars to extend wifi networks across the globe and train teachers (Markoff, 2006) . Myriad other smaller projects also employ the 'digital divide' as a framing mechanism. While motivations are likely more economic than altruistic, the fact that such enormous sums are being spent under the banner of alleviating a 'digital divide' does highlight the discursive weight that the idea contains.
The sums invested under the banner of reducing a 'digital divide' are staggering. The combined figures mentioned above are alone larger than the gross domestic products of some countries, and beg two questions: Why are such massive sums invested in the name of bridging a 'digital divide'?; and what outcomes do funding organisations expect to achieve by narrowing 'digital divides'? To answer these questions, we can turn to the ways that the trope is being put to use. The following section therefore outlines some of the temporal and spatial assumptions that are frequently embroiled into 'digital divide' discourses. The temporal assumptions will only be covered briefly, primarily because similar arguments have already been made by a number of development theorists. The spatial assumptions, however, are more unique to discourses surrounding the 'digital divide,' and will thus be brought to the fore.
Ontological Underpinnings
Irrespective of how any 'digital divide' discourse is formulated, the trope is always used to refer to a gap in capabilities, potentials, and possibilities between different groups or places. Furthermore, a 'digital divide' is never posited as a beneficial or positive outcome; it is rather something to be alleviated, filled, narrowed, reduced, stepped over, or shrunk. However, there remain a range of diverse visions about what the precise outcomes of bridging a 'digital divide' would be. This is in part because the trope of a 'digital divide' is inherently spatial, and as such necessarily rests on distinct ontologies of the relationships between time, space and technology.
Temporal Assumptions
There is a long history in the academic and policy literatures of seeing development as a progression along a linear temporal path. Rostow (1960) , for example, created a five-stage model of economic growth, and asserted that all societies could be placed somewhere in-between a traditional subsistence economy, and the end-point of 'high mass consumption.' Much of the rhetoric on the 'digital divide' is no exception. On the temporal path of digital development, many posit a forwards and a backwards with people and places who are behind using ICTs to 'catch up' with those who are in front. Norris (2001: 5) (G8, 2000) It has also been argued that communication technologies can be employed to enable 'catching up' to happen at a sub-national level. Borgida et. al. (2002: 128) , for example proposed that:
In order to maintain a healthy economy and a vibrant workforce, electronic networks are one way some rural communities are attempting to catch up to urban areas… Others still point out that different demographic groups separated by a 'digital divide' can 'catch up'. For instance, Hoffman and Novak (1998) argue that socioeconomic racial differences will "disappear as African Americans "catch up" to whites in terms of time spent online
iii ." Even amongst the few authors who maintain that the 'digital divide' is not a pressing issue, the language of 'catching up' is prominent:
… though developing countries have fallen behind economically over the past decades, they managed to catch up digitally (Fink and Kenny, 2003: 19) .
Using ICTs to bridge a 'digital divide' is thus in many cases seen as a way of moving people and places temporally along a pre-defined path of development. This line of thought is perhaps best articulated by Nirj Deva, a Member of the European Parliament, who in relaying plans to make universal access to ICTs the ninth United Nations Millennium Development Goal exclaimed that "We are not delivering a computer. We are delivering a time machine. A time machine that is so enormously transformational that everything after that is changed. Changed forever" (Deva, 2008) . As James Ferguson (1999) and others have previously noted, the linear, teleological assumptions that underlie much development theory and practice can greatly reduce the possibilities for open politics (see also Ferguson, 1994 , Escobar, 1995 . It is clear that digital-development is no exception, and imaginations of linear temporal paths of development can similarly close down discussion and reduce the scope for contingent alternatives.
Spatial Assumptions
Some commentators have suggested that both the discursive power and the problematics inherent to the 'digital divide' rest on technological determinist uses of the trope (see Warschauer, 2003a) . For example, Warschauer (2003b) notes that the 'digital divide' is posited as a technological problem that has a necessary technological solution. While the simplicity of such arguments makes them simultaneously appealing and problematic (albeit to different audiences), I would, rather, maintain that a lot of the power embedded in discourses about the 'digital divide' lies in the fact that they are able to postulate movement not only in time, but also across space. Much of the spatiality embedded into rhetoric about the 'digital divide' refers to the geography of the divide itself. That is, a divide can be thought to exist between the North and South, East and West, urban and rural etc. However, the 'digital divide' is increasingly being used to refer not to a divide in capabilities or technical ability, but rather to a more existential divide: namely, an actual divide in shared co-presence in cyberspace.
Cyberspace
To fully explore the ways that space is conceptualised and used as an epistemological and ontological framework within discourses of a 'digital divide' it is first necessary to more thoroughly explore the nature of cyberspace itself. Like the 'digital divide,' cyberspace is an inherently geographic concept. When employed as a metaphor within the contexts of discussions about socio-economic change, cyberspace can become a useful heuristic device upon which issues of spatial division and unequal access can be framed.
However, cyberspace has often taken on an ontic role. Cyberspace, in this sense, is conceived of as both an ethereal alternate dimension which is simultaneously infinite and everywhere (because everyone with an Internet connection can enter), and as fixed in a distinct location, albeit a non-physical one (because despite being infinitely accessible all willing participants are thought to arrive into the same marketspace, civic forum, and social space). Cyberspace, in this sense truly becomes a global village. Therefore, cyberspace, like other spaces, has a mappable form, but exists beyond the material world (Batty and Miller, 2000, Dodge and Kitchin, 2001 ). It becomes a shared virtual reality and a consensual hallucination (Gibson, 1984) , which is "generating an entirely new dimension to geography" (Batty, 1997: 339) .
The precise sources of this a priori ontology of cyberspace as simultaneously infinite and fixed are unclear. One argument that has been put forward is that cyberspace as a 'global village' satisfies a dualistic philosophy of space that has only relatively recently been replaced with a monistic one (Wertheim, 1999) . Descartes, for instance, separated reality into the res extensa (the realm of corporeal substance and matter) and the res cognitans (the ethereal realm of thoughts and non-material, spiritual existence). Variations of this dualistic worldview were widely accepted in Western society until the materialism of the scientific revolution resulted in a shift towards an understanding of reality as being comprised solely of the physical realm. With the invention of the Internet, Margaret Wertheim argues that "the emergence of a new kind of nonphysical space [cyberspace] was almost guaranteed to attract "spiritual" and even "heavenly" dreams" and thus be viewed as a "technological res cognitans" (Wertheim, 1999: 38) .
Even before the coining of the term 'cyberspace,' commentators were speculating that synchronous communication technologies like the telegraph would bring humanity together in some sort of shared space (Standage, 1998) . For instance, in 1846, in a proposal to connect European and American cities via an Atlantic telegraph, it was stated that one of the benefits would be the fact that "all of the inhabitants of the earth would be brought into one intellectual neighbourhood and be at the same time perfectly freed from those contaminations which might under other circumstances be received" (Marvin, 1988: 201) . Twelve years later after the completion of the Atlantic telegraph, The Times proclaimed that "the Atlantic is dried up, and we become in reality as well as in wish one country" (quoted in Standage, 1998: 80) . In the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan's philosophy of media posited a future not too different from proclamations about the power of communication technologies a century earlier. He noted that "electric circuitry has overthrown the regime of "time" and "space" and pours upon us instantly and continuously concerns of all other men. It has reconstituted dialogue on a global scale..."Time" has ceased, "space" has vanished. We now live in a global village" (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967: 63) .
Such ideas were equally prevalent in the early days of the Internet. John Barlow (1996) , for example, in his Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, boldly asserts that "cyberspace does not lie within your borders" and "ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live." Trotter Hardy (1994) in a discussion about appropriate legal regimes for cyberspace similarly posits the idea that cyberspace is a distinct and separate space.
Representations or allusions to the Internet in popular culture often reinforce the ontic role given to cyberspace. For instance, Dave Chappelle's (2004) comedy sketch titled What if the Internet was a place that you could go to? in which he strolls around cyberspace, deliberately gives the Internet physical, spatial, and fixed properties iv It is likely that development professionals have also played a hand in either creating or reproducing this discourse through reports by, or reports used by, international organisations. Kirkman and Sachs' Global Information Technology Report, for instance, implies that there is 'a' market that can be tapped by entering the infinity of cyberspace (Kirkman et al., 2002) . Similar conceptions of 'a' global market can be found in the World Economic Forum's other Global Information Technology Reports and Global Competitiveness Reports, as well as publications by the World Trade Organization, various UN agencies, the World Bank, and countless other international organisations and NGOs (c.f. Porter et al., 2002) . The World Bank's 'Artisan as Entrepreneur' project supports concrete programs that aim to bring "crafts from Latin America, Asia, and Africa onto the global market" (World Bank, 2000: 3, emphasis added). Hundreds of articles in the popular press recycle similar stories about the potentials of e-commerce and the Internet as a means of providing access to 'a' global market that can be entered through the gateway of the Internet (c.f. Faucon, 2001 ). Many of these articles again contain the idea that cyberspace contains 'a' fixed marketplace, which despite being a singular location, is infinitely accessible.
. The Matrix trilogy of films, which in many ways reverses the ideas of cyberspace and physical space, can similarly be seen to assign to the virtual an ontic role (Wachowski and Wachowski, 1999) . The Matrix (an illusion of the physical world) can be exited from anywhere using a telephone. Doing so brings the user of the telephone back into a shared alternate dimension. Neal Stephenson's (1992) novel, Snow Crash, also describes a three-dimensional evolution of the Internet (which he dubs 'the Metaverse') in which users can attain co-presence in a virtual dimension accessible from anywhere on Earth. There have actually been a number of highly successful real-life implementations of versions of Stephenson's Metaverse. Second Life (with over fifteen million users) and World of Warcraft (with over eleven million users) are two of the most popular examples.
It is interesting, then, to note the differences between the ontology of cyberspace as simultaneously infinite and fixed that is present in the words of businesses, development organisations, and much of the media, and the ways that academic geographers have theorised the existence of cyberspace. Geographers have largely moved beyond the idea that space-transcending possibilities of cyberspace will render geography meaningless (c.f. Couclelis, 1996 , Cairncross, 1997 . Spatial differences continue to exist because, far from being uniformly distributed, communications technologies and opportunities for production and consumption have a pronounced geographic bias (Castells, 2002 , Dodge and Kitchin, 2001 , Zook, 2000 , Townsend, 2001 , Gorman and Malecki, 2002 . In part because of its geographic bias, cyberspace is far from being a 'global village' or a universally accessible marketplace, and indeed has its own mappable geographies and uneven topologies (Brunn and Dodge, 2001 , Zook, 2005a , Zook, 2005b ) (see for example, the map of the structure of cyberspace in figure 1). Cyberspace and the 'Digital Divide' Graham (1998) argues for complex and parallel considerations of electronic and physical propinquity. Technology is described as being an appendage to life in the physical world rather than a replacement. Communications technologies can alter and redefine relative distance, but they are unable to cancel out geography, and as a result we live in a state of suspension between our de-localised presences and our physical existences (Robins, 1995 , Castells, 2002 .
Others have suggested envisioning cyberspace "as a socially constructed discourse that simultaneously reflects and constitutes social reality" in order to focus on the social outcomes it brings about (Warf, 2001: 6) . Kitchin (1998) recommends that cyberspace be conceptualised as existing in a symbiotic relationship with geographic space. Cohen (2007) similarly suggests that cyberspace is an evolution and extension of everyday spatial practice rather than a separate space. She notes, "cyberspace is in and of the real-space world, and is so not (only) because real-space sovereigns decree it, or (only) because real-space sovereigns can exert physical power over real-space users, but also and more fundamentally because cyberspace users are situated in real space" (Cohen, 2007: 218) . In other words, the Internet and other ICTs can give rise to an individual sphere of hybrid geography in which certain distancetranscending activities can be performed while being simultaneously embedded in and influenced by the performer's positionality in material space.
It should be noted that, the global village conceptualisation of cyberspace is far from a dominant discourse. For example, some popular writings about the Internet do often allude to notions of hybridity, and it is unlikely that many people imagine that they are entering into another dimension when they are Googling, Facebooking, and Twittering from their mobile devices. Yet, it remains that such conceptualisations of a hybrid virtual/physical sphere of existence for Internet-users rarely enter into discussions of a 'digital divide.' Uses of the 'digital divide' are instead often grounded in an ontology that presents cyberspace as being simultaneously infinite and fixed. Hence, the 'digital divide' becomes not a statistical divide between people or places, but rather an existential divide between those that can access a shared cyberspace, and those on the other side of a gulf who remain rooted to the physical world.
This ontic divide becomes all the more significant when seen in the contexts of the 'information revolution' and the literatures on the networked society. Those without access to the 'global village' are therefore seen to be segregated from the contemporary socio-economic revolution taking place. Some, such as former US secretary of State Colin Powell (2000) , and the chief executive of 3Com (Macavinta 1998) , have on separate occasions gone so far as to term this exclusion "digital apartheid."
When relying on the 'global village' conceptualisation of what ICTs can do to space, it is easy to see how the discourse of a 'digital divide' has been able to attract such enormous amounts of funding and interest. But it still remains to be seen whether powerful claims about the effects of ICTs on those who are left out of the information revolution will prove prescient. Because of the contemporaneity of the Internet, there remains no comprehensive body of empirical literature on the effects of ICTs and cyberspace on socio-economic processes. However, existing research does indicate that it is unlikely that ICTs can ever allow co-presence in a singular 'global village. ' For instance, one study on attempts to use the Internet to bridge a 'digital divide' in Northeast Thailand in order to allow silk weavers access to a global marketplace found that a priori ontologies of cyberspace that posit a universally accessible yet fixed and bounded dimension rarely match up to the experiences that silk sellers have with the Internet (Graham, 2008a , Graham, 2010b . The Internet was not being used as a middle ground or an intermediate virtual space that bridges nonproximate buyers and sellers. Instead, producers and merchants that were able to use the Internet as a tool to sell silk were, in most cases, interacting with non-proximate customers through highly individualised and non-transparent conduits (see also : Sheppard, 2002 , Graham, 2008b . Transactions thus took place not in an alternate virtual space, but in the real world through virtual conduits. The primary reason for the disconnect between many of the oft-repeated, a priori ontologies of cyberspace and the realities of concrete attempts to use ICTs to reduce a 'digital divide' was that cyberspace is not a container of a singular globally accessible market. The study demonstrated that market-spaces brought into being by the Internet are instead often scattered, disconnected, individual, hybrid, and perhaps most important, ranked and ordered. Warschauer (2003a: 297) In the contexts of the Egyptian educational system, Warschauer found that despite significant expenditures to reduce a 'digital divide,' students were never being teleported into virtual forums of learning, or cyber-libraries v . Instead, despite the necessary hardware being in place in schools across the country, access to knowledge remained constrained by multiple layers of restrictive political, social, and bureaucratic factors. Here again, it is clear that cyberspace cannot be viewed as a disconnected, floating dimension. The Internet was instead embedded into the many restrictive social, political, and economic factors that exist outside of the virtual realm. In both of these examples, it is clear that a reliance on the 'digital divide' discourse and its necessary linkages to specific ontologies of cyberspace obscures and even depoliticises solutions to fundamental problems related to the ability to access information and communicate non-proximately.
Re-theorising the 'Digital Divide'
The critiques offered in this paper are not meant to suggest that the notion of a 'digital divide' is theoretically ineffectual. This paper is in addition by no means an attempt to suggest that efforts made to connect the disconnected should not be made. Rather, a richer formulation of the 'digital divide' is needed: specifically, one that takes into account theorisations of hybrid and embedded cyberspaces. Grounding any theorisation of a 'digital divide' in alternate spatial underpinnings would thus allow more realistic expectations of spatial effects of digital technologies to be created.
The 'digital divide' should not be conceived of as a singular chasm separating an Internet-user from communication, knowledge, or interaction. Such a conceptualisation would imply that, were a metaphorical bridge to be built, the Internet-user could easily pass over the chasm and enter the cyberspace that she or he was previously divided from. The spatiality of this metaphor is grounded in a vision of cyberspace as a 'global village,' and, as such, allows both cyberspace and the 'digital divide' to take on ontic roles. Instead, two types of divides should be recognised: the physical divides separating people from access to cyberspaces, and the cyber-divides that obstruct movement between cyberspaces.
Material Divides
Rather than imagining cyberspace as a 'global village' that can be stepped into, it is helpful to use Julie Cohen's formulation of the cyberspace metaphor. Cohen argues that cyberspace "does not refer to abstract, Cartesian space, but instead expresses an experienced spatiality mediated by embodied human cognition. Cyberspace in this sense is relative, mutable, and constituted via the interactions among practice, conceptualisation, and representation." In other words, cyberspaces operate as "as both extension and evolution of everyday spatial practice" (Cohen, 2007) and are perpetually created and re-created through highly individualised interactions. Cyberspace is therefore not a singular ontic entity and no amount of work to bridge a 'digital divide' could ever create such a space. School children in Egypt, village weavers in Thailand, and everyone else thought to be on the wrong side of a 'digital divide' cannot enter into a 'global village' to learn and trade because a 'global village' has no ontic basis.
The concept of a 'digital divide' should thus be pluralised, localised and grounded in more appropriate spatial frameworks. The initial material divide concerns a lack of access to the entry points of cyberspace. This divide is almost entirely a question of resources. People need the hardware (computer, modem, router, etc.), software (i.e. browser and email client), and an Internet connection (either hardwired or a wireless access point). Without access to all of the above, there can be no entry into any cyberspaces. Although the material 'digital divide' revolves entirely around access to hardware, software, and a connection point, the solution to it cannot be entirely economic. Myriad other factors related to the politics and practices of access (such as gender, class, and age) can be as equally inhibitive as financial barriers. Telecentres and Internet cafes, for example, are often highly gendered spaces and can be unwelcoming to women, while wifi access points by their nature discriminate against the poorest members of society by requiring users to own a laptop computer. Many of these points have indeed been recognised in recent formulations of the 'digital divide' (c.f. Chakraborty and Bosman, 2005 , Gilbert and Masucci, 2005 , Gilbert et al., 2008 , Schwanen and Kwan, 2008 , Selwyn, 2004 , Barzilai-Nahon, 2006 , Crang et al., 2006 , Grasland and Puel, 2007 ).
Yet, in part because of the existence of the 'global village' ontology of cyberspace, there is often a pollyannish assumption that once the material 'digital divide' is bridged, the many problems attributed to 'digital divides' will also vanish. Or, in other words, despite the myriad barriers to access, once people are placed in front of connected terminals, the 'digital divide' becomes bridged and the previously disconnected are consequently able to enter cyberspace.
Virtual-divides
Once connected, entirely different divides are potentially encountered within the experienced and imagined fabrics of cyberspace. After overcoming the initial physical divide, Internet users still have not necessarily achieved virtual co-presence with all other Internet users, nor are they free or able to enter all cyberplaces. The map of the Internet (in figure 1) illustrated a useful conceptualisation of the topologies of the Internet. Instead of being a singular location, users are able to engage with (or through) billions of nodes which are often poorly networked.
Even when there is a large amount of convergence to specific cyberspaces in which co-presence can be attained (traditional chatrooms or more recent virtual environments vi The most apparent are those related to censorship and the securitisation of cyberspaces (Deibert, 2003) . Nation-states, government agencies, the private sector, and even individuals are all able to construct layers of censorship that effectively make parts of the Internet inaccessible (c.f. Faris et al., 2008) . These attempts to block access to cyberspaces include: the situation in North Korea where only a few that can be embedded into any webpage are examples), cyberpresence is rarely static. Internet users navigate through not only the network of the Internet, but also through the often labyrinthine topologies of individual websites (see figure 2 for an adaptive visualisation of how people use websites). government officials are permitted to access the Internet (Reporters Without Borders, 2005) , the French Government's successful attempts to restrict the visibility of Nazi memorabilia online (Drissel, 2006) , the restriction of access to websites deemed to threaten national security in a variety of countries including China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand (Graham and Khosravi, 2002 , Xue, 2005 , Kluver and Banerjee, 2005 , Hofheinz, 2005 , Dann and Haddow, 2007 , efforts by businesses and schools to limit access to only approved websites (Hamade, 2008) , and commercial censorship software designed to prevent children from accessing some websites.
Figure 2: Adaptive Visualisation of how People use Websites
In terms of virtual topology, there can therefore never be a singular divide. Space created within the Internet is not binary in the sense that a person is either inside or outside, separated by a 'digital divide'. There are rather countless small (although important and often insurmountable) 'digital divides' preventing movement through the topologies of the Internet and limiting access to cyberspaces. These divides can take myriad forms, but all ultimately relate to issues of accessibility and visibility. Three of the most common divides are discussed below.
Cultural differences also play a large role in determining the ways in which Internet-users are able to interact and access information (c.f. Recabarren et al., 2008) . Language is likely the largest and most significant barrier to access on the Internet. A majority of Internet-users are now non-native English speakers (Shea et al., 2007) . However, it remains that English is a dominant language on the Internet (Flammia and Saunders, 2007) and despite recent developments in machine translation, those not fluent in English are likely to face significant barriers to both non-proximate communication and organising online content into meaning. The contexts and positionalities of information sources and those accessing virtual information also strongly influence how information can be retrieved and used. Withers and Grout (2006) , for instance, in their discussion of virtual archives, argue that information on the Internet can often be interpreted in ways that differ sharply from the emotional and aesthetic relationships between information sources and the readers of information in the non-virtual world. Furthermore, barriers exist which limit not only the comprehension and interpretation of content, but also its creation. For example, digital ethnographies have shown that in wikis, methods employed to resolve disagreements about the ways a subject should be represented are frequently opaque and often favour distinct demographics (usually young Western males) (O'Neil, 2009) .
Finally, there are the divides brought about by online visibility (or a lack thereof). There are immense difficulties involved in being able to organise, classify, and move through the thirty billion vii In practice, this means that the websites of organisations already well integrated into the social and economic fabric of large segments of society (e.g. the New York Times or Amazon.com) are more likely to be made visible than the websites of smaller organisations. To return to the two examples used earlier in the paper, we can see that visibility can cause divides for producers and consumers of information. Many Thai silk sellers construct elaborate websites which end up not being found by any potential buyers due to the fact that they have low rankings in search engines. Egyptian school children similarly might in theory have access to an enormous amount of content on the Internet, but if there is no apparent route to access specific websites (i.e. they are not indexed in search engines or listed in directories), the children inevitably will not visit those sites. Therefore, even when 'digital divides' have, in theory, been bridged (e.g. allowing Thai silk sellers to engage in e-commerce and Egyptian children access to educational materials), there can, in practice, remain fundamental divides brought about by a simple lack of visibility. web pages on the Internet (c.f. Senécal, 2005) . Ranking and ordering systems (i.e. search engines and online directories) are powerful factors which allow some information to remain visible while other content stays hidden. As a consequence, a website can exist in cyberspace and be accessible from anywhere in the world, but essentially be cloaked and invisible if it is not networked. An issue faced by those attempting to access the websites of less wellknown people and organisations is the fact that all sorting, ordering, and ranking systems are inevitably hierarchical Graham, 2007b, Zook and Graham, 2007a) . The Google search engine, for example, has a search algorithm that is modeled after the academic search literature. The algorithm is designed under the assumption that the number of hyperlinks (and ultimately the rank of those hyperlinks) to a page is an indication of the quality or importance of that page. The ranking that a webpage ultimately receives from a search algorithm is critically important for online visibility as research has shown that only a small minority of Internet searchers move beyond the first ten results presented to them (Jansena et al., 2000) .
Conclusions
There is a widespread assumption that an information revolution is taking place in contemporary society. Economic, cultural, and political interactions and relationships are increasingly grounded in ICTs and are reliant on unimpeded flows of information over space. However, a majority of the world's population is being excluded from these new ways of organising society (only twenty two percent of Asians and eleven percent of Africans have access to the Internet) (Internet World Stats, 2009) . As a result, many individuals, organisations, and governments have expressed concern and invested enormous sums of money to eliminate a perceived 'digital divide. ' Some of these projects have been highly effective, and indeed, Internet usage rates in much of the world are growing rapidly. Yet it remains that success stories can be difficult to find. There are too many examples of failed development projects, computers collecting dust, and websites hidden to all but the most proficient of searchers. More importantly, there are too many examples of large amounts of resources invested into projects designed under an (almost always incorrect) assumption that computers and an Internet connection would be a sufficient investment to bring about a meaningful amount of co-presence. Within the contexts of development, resources are always finite; for every funded project many others are left unfunded, and it clearly takes forceful imagery such as the 'digital divide,' 'digital apartheid,' and the 'global village' to allow funds to be spent on ICTs rather than vaccines, water pumps, and textbooks.
Nonetheless, as this paper has argued, more nuance is needed if metaphors such as the 'digital divide' are to be continued to be used. An assumption in much of what is written about the 'digital divide' is that both cyberspace and the divide separating the disconnected from it are distinct, singular, ontic entities. Bridging a 'digital divide' is often thought to be a panacea to issues of development: allowing people and places to move temporally forwards on a path of development by being closer in relative space to the sites of the information revolution. This paper argues that the trope of a 'digital divide' should be pluralised, localised and grounded in more appropriate spatial frameworks. Because of the nature of virtual topologies, there can never be a singular divide. There is no singular floating cyberspace, in the sense that a person is either inside or outside, separated by a 'digital divide'. There are rather countless small (although often insurmountable) 'digital divides' preventing movement through the topologies of the Internet and limiting access to cyberspaces.
The consequences of being excluded from the Internet can in many cases be severe. People can be left out of networks and flows of information, thereby reinforcing existing social, economic and political power structures. While ICTs cannot alone flatten structural and social forces of exclusion and inequality they can, nonetheless, be a powerful impetus behind positive economic and social change.
As such, it is important to recognise that while online access is not a determinant of participation in the information revolution, it is a prerequisite. Policy makers should therefore always employ the 'digital divide' metaphor with caution. Attaining any semblance of virtual co-presence in order to achieve economic, social, and political goals involves the circumvention of not only the material divides (i.e. the fact that there is a lack of co-presence between people and information), but also the myriad divides that obstruct communication within the networks of the Internet. Because virtual information and online networks are not a floating 'global village,' 'digital divides' are consequently contingent on the economic, cultural, political and technological positionalities of each person attempting to access the Internet.
